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The Crimean crisis may constitute a turning point in the development of 
international relations in Europe. Russia has incorporated parts of the terri-
tory of another sovereign state and has thereby resorted to a political strate-
gy that was considered passé in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. 
The crisis has caused a large division between Russia and a few allies on the 
one hand, and the Western states on the other hand – an end of which is not 
yet in sight. Tensions between Russia and all Western States have reached a 
level unknown since the end of the cold war. Moreover, the assessment of 
the events from an international law perspective mirrors the geo-political 
camps. Hardly any “Western” politician or scholar deems Russia’s political 
course justifiable and justified under the precepts of international law. In-
versely, from what we can perceive from the outside, Russian politicians and 
scholars seem confident to be able to properly justify the incorporation of 
Crimea within the framework of the existing international legal order. The 
crisis is matched by the absence of a serious legal dialogue among interna-
tional legal scholars of both camps. 
This journal’s symposium builds on a conference that was held at the 
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law 
on September 2-3, 2014 in Heidelberg. The objective was to break up intel-
lectual solipsism, and to gather scholars of international law from Europe, 
including Russia and Ukraine, for an open exchange of arguments on the 
issue. It was for all we know the first academic event of this type since the 
outbreak of the crisis. It proved to be more difficult to realize than initially 
expected, because many international lawyers from Russia and from 
Ukraine declined our invitation for one reason or another. The first part of 
the conference was supposed to develop a deeper understanding of the rele-
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vant principles and rules. Only in the second part, these norms were to be 
applied to the case. The conference also dealt with the declaration of inde-
pendence of Kosovo, to avoid the impression that the meeting sought to 
place one country in the dock, and because Kosovo was often cited as a 
precedent during the Crimea crisis, for good or bad reasons. 
Presentations were given by scholars from Belarus, the Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, the divide 
mentioned above surfaced at the conference itself. A number of Western 
scholars were critical of the European strategy towards the association of 
Ukraine to the European Union and about the West’s policies regarding the 
independence of Kosovo,1 but nevertheless agreed that the incorporation of 
Crimea into the Russian Federation was manifestly illegal under interna-
tional law. The Russian contributors, on the other hand, argued in favour of 
the legality of the incorporation of Crimea, primarily invoking the principle 
of the self-determination of peoples. However, their arguments relied above 
all on domestic law, on historical considerations, on political arguments, or 
on readings of international legal norms which – in our view – depart from 
prior scholarly consensus, not only among Western scholars but shared 
around the globe. 
As a matter of fact and as already stated, the contemporary academic de-
bates in Russia, Ukraine and other Eastern, Central and Western European 
states seem to be conducted in isolation and detached from each other. We 
perceive an urgent need to offer spaces for scholarly exchanges in which 
these academic universes meet and might refer and connect to each other. It 
is a truism but maybe worth repeating at this occasion that the function and 
purpose of international law as a global order demands a genuinely transna-
tional academic and practical legal discourse whose participants accept that 
arguments are sound only if they are fit for universal application.2 
                                                        
1  See M. Hartwig, Das Gutachten des Internationalen Gerichtshofs zur Unabhängigkeits-
erklärung des Kosovo – Vorgeschichte und “Urteils”kritik, Osteuropa-Recht 58 (2012), 11 et 
seq. 
2  The phenomenon that international legal scholars often espouse positions which can be 
linked to their prior education in their domestic legal system and which serve the national 
interest has been called “epistemic nationalism” (A. Peters, Die Zukunft der Völkerrechtswis-
senschaft: Wider den epistemischen Nationalismus, ZaöRV/HJIL 67 (2007), 721 et seq.). See 
on the necessity (and feasibility) of making arguments about international law that can be 
understood and replicated by individuals independent from their national background A. 
Peters (note 2), at 764 et seq. This does not imply that scholars should completely detach 
themselves from their education and cultural context (which would be impossible and unnec-
essary), as long as they make a conscious effort to internalize the “others’” perspectives. 
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The publication of the contributions to the conference has, against this 
background, one primary purpose.3 It aims to document the exchange of 
arguments and, in doing so, bring into the Western debate the views of Rus-
sian and other Eastern European scholars. In order to serve this purpose, we 
did not substantively interfere with the arguments made in the written con-
tributions but concentrated on formal editing. The papers did not undergo a 
peer review in a strict sense. They thus reflect the authentic position of the 
authors, independently from what the symposium editors would have pre-
ferred as a legal approach. Hence, the symposium is not necessarily a com-
pilation of the best arguments in the case, but a somehow historic documen-
tation of the arguments that international lawyers from various “schools” 
have in fact made. We deem this authenticity to be valuable as such, show-
ing how international law has been used in a specific crisis. It will be up to 
the reader to find out where the better arguments can be identified. The fact 
of publication does not imply any substantive approval by the editors of the 
symposium and of the Heidelberg Journal of International Law. 
                                                        
3  The symposium editors would like to thank Dr. Tigran Beknazar, Juliane Dieroff, Dr. 
Stephan Hinghofer-Szalkay, Dr. Christiane Philipp, and Beate Streicher for support in prepar-
ing the publication. 
  
 
